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Abstract	
A	principal	source	of	interest	in	behavioral	economics	has	been	its	advertised	
contributions	to	policies	aimed	at	‘nudging’	people	away	from	allegedly	natural	but	self-
defeating	behavior	toward	patterns	of	response	thought	more	likely	to	improve	their	
welfare.	This	has	occasioned	controversies	among	economists	and	philosophers	around	
the	normative	limits	of	paternalism,	especially	by	technical	policy	advisors.	One	recent	
suggestion	has	been	that	‘boosting,’	in	which	interventions	aim	to	enhance	people’s	
general	cognitive	skills	and	representational	repertoires	instead	of	manipulating	their	
choice	environments	behind	their	backs,	avoids	the	main	normative	challenges.	A	
limitation	in	most	of	this	literature	is	that	it	has	focused	on	relatively	sweeping	policy	
recommendations	and	consequently	on	strong	polar	alternatives	of	general	paternalism	
and	strict	laissez	faire.	We	review	a	real	instance,	drawn	from	a	consulting	project	we	
conducted	for	an	investment	bank,	of	a	proposed	intervention	that	is	more	typical	of	the	
kind	that	economists	are	more	often	actually	called	upon	to	offer.	In	this	example,	the	
sophistication	of	current	tools	for	preference	attribution,	combined	with	philosophical	
externalism	about	the	semantics	of	preferences	that	makes	it	less	plausible	to	attribute	
their	literal	self-conscious	representation	to	people	as	propositional	attitude	content	
becomes	more	tightly	refined,	blocks	applicability	of	the	distinction	between	nudging	
and	boosting.		This	seems	to	call	for	irreducible,	context-specific	ethical	judgment	in	
assessing	the	appropriateness	of	the	forms	of	paternalism	that	economists	must	
actually	wrestle	with	in	going	about	their	everyday	business.		
Keywords:	nudging,	paternalism,	applied	economics,	risk	preferences,	investment	
choices	
JEL	codes:	A11,	A13,	B40,	C44,	C54,	C93,	D01,	D14,	D63,	D81,	D91	
	
1.	Nudging	Versus	Boosting	
A	principal	source	of	interest	in	behavioral	economics	has	been	its	advertised	
contributions	to	policies	aimed	at	‘nudging’	people	away	from	allegedly	natural	but	self-
defeating	behavior	toward	patterns	of	response	thought	more	likely	to	improve	their	
welfare.	Leading	early	promotions	of	this	kind	of	application	of	behavioral	studies	are	
Camerer	et	al	(2003)	and	Sunstein	&	Thaler	(2003a)(2003b).	Grüne-Yanoff	&	Hertwig	
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(2016)	[GYH]	have	distinguished	nudging,	which	is	based	on	the	heuristics-and-biases	
(H&B)	branch	of	behavioral	economics	research	associated	with	Kahneman	&	Tversky	
(1982)	and	Kahneman	(2011),	from	policies	aimed	at	‘boosting,’	which	apply	the	
‘simple	heuristics’	(SH)	research	program	of	Gigerenzer	et	al	(1999),	Todd	et	al	(2012)	
and	Hertwig	et	al	(2013).	Nudging	and	boosting	are	contrasted	as	follows.	Nudges	aim	
to	change	a	decision-maker’s	(DM)	ecological	context	and	external	cognitive	affordances	
in	such	a	way	that	the	DM	will	be	more	likely	to	choose	a	welfare-improving	option	
without	having	to	think	any	differently	than	before.	Nudging	is	thus	open	to	the	charge	
that	it	is	manipulative:	see	Ashcroft	(2011)	and	Conly	(2012;	p.	8).	Its	defenders	point	
out	that	if	people	are	naturally	prone	to	systematic	error,	then	any	scaffolding	built	by	
any	institution	unavoidably	involves	manipulation,	so	the	manipulation	in	question	
might	as	well	be	benevolent.	Boosting,	by	contrast,	involves	endowing	DMs	with	
enhanced	cognitive	capacities	by	teaching	them	more	effective	decision	principles1,	
which	they	can	choose	to	apply	or	not	once	they	have	been	enlightened.	Thus	boosting,	
according	to	GYH,	avoids	manipulating	the	agents	to	whom	the	policies	in	question	are	
applied,	and	is	to	that	extent	less	paternalistic.2		
An	additional	contrast	relevant	to	normative	assessment	is	that	a	nudge	would	
normally	be	expected	to	have	effects	only	on	the	specific	behavior	to	which	it	is	applied,	
and	only	in	the	setting	that	the	nudge	adjusts.	A	boost,	on	the	other	hand,	to	the	extent	
that	it	alters	standing	cognitive	capacities	and	associated	behavioral	propensities	across	
ranges	of	structurally	similar	choice	problems,	might	be	hoped	to	generate	‘rationality	
spillovers’	discussed	by	Cherry	et	al	(2003).	Furthermore,	boosting	might	plausibly	
capacitate	people	with	defenses	against	non-benevolent	nudging	by	narrowly	self-
interested	parties	such	as	marketers	and	demagogues.	
The	classic	example	of	nudging	is	changing	default	options.	If	the	policy	maker	
thinks	that	workers	ought	to	invest	in	retirement	savings	plans,	then	the	policy	maker	
can	make	participation	the	outcome	if	the	DM	is	passive,	needing	to	take	action	only	if	
the	DM	wants	to	act	on	a	preference	not	to	participate.	The	leading	example	of	a	boost	
discussed	by	GYH	is	teaching	people	to	represent	the	alternatives	in	risky	decisions	as	
natural	frequencies,	even	when	they	are	presented	as	probabilities.	This	is	thought	to	
improve	the	quality	of	choices	because	evidence	suggests	that	some	people	are	more	
likely	to	use	‘accuracy-promoting’	heuristics	when	reasoning	about	the	former	than	
when	reasoning	about	the	latter.	
Almost	all	examples	in	the	literature	on	both	nudges	and	boosts	resemble	these	
in	taking	the	policy	maker	or	the	educator	as	the	target	community	for	whose	
																																																								
1	GYH	assume	that	the	principles	in	question	should	be	effective	heuristics	in	the	sense	
of	Gigerenzer	et	al	(1999).	This	reflects	the	arguable	assumption	that	any	general	
reasoning	principle	that	most	people	can	adopt	reliably	across	a	range	of	decision	
contexts	is	by	definition	a	heuristic.	
2	This	motivation	for	boosting	is	similar	to	reasons	given	by	John	et	al	(2009)	and	John	
et	al	(2011)	in	favour	of	what	they	call	a	‘think’	strategy	for	correcting	people’s	
reasoning	errors.		Such	strategies	are	a	special	case	of	boosting	that	work	through	
engaging	the	intended	beneficiaries	in	collective	deliberation.	The	form	of	boosting	we	
will	consider	does	not	involve	such	deliberation.	We	share	the	concerns	of	Le	Grand	&	
New	(2015,	p.	142)	concerning	the	general	practicality	and	likely	effectiveness	of	think	
strategies.	
	 3	
consideration	the	policies	are	proposed.	Though	there	is	typically	a	general	
presumption	that	members	of	these	communities	should	prefer	to	avoid	gratuitous	
paternalism,	it	is	often	assumed	that	their	primary	aim	is	to	maximize	the	probability	
that	DMs	influenced	by	their	policy	choices	or	educational	interventions	will	maximize	
their	welfare.	Examples	are	typically	constructed	in	such	a	way	that	what	is	taken	to	be	
the	welfare-maximizing	behavior	is	transparent.	
This	frame	will	strike	many	economists	as	problematic.	Economists	are	typically	
more	reluctant	than	policy	makers	or	pedagogues	to	help	themselves	to	opinions	about	
what	constitutes	an	agent’s	welfare.	There	is	a	strong	tradition	in	economics	of	treating	
preferences	as	summaries	of,	or	statistical	patterns	in,	actual	choices,	rather	than	as	
independent	standards	against	which	to	try	to	regulate	decisions.	Clearly	this	is	partly	
because	mainstream	economics	descends	historically	and	intellectually	from	utilitarian	
and	classical	liberal	political	and	moral	philosophies	that	view	paternalism	as	more	or	
less	anathema.	But	suspicion	about	welfare	judgments	that	aren’t	derived	directly	from	
the	observed	behavior	of	the	people	whose	welfare	is	being	judged	also	has	other,	more	
deliberative,	sources.	First,	economists	are	typically	highly	sensitive	to	prospects	for	
unintended	consequences	of	policies.	They	see	these	as	mainly	arising	from	the	
interactions	of	people	with	heterogeneous	preferences,	or	differing	resources,	or	both,	
and	so	are	less	sanguine	than	many	policy	makers	about	letting	normative	
considerations	that	are	not	fully	decentralized	drive	policy	choices.	A	myriad	of	micro-
scale	decisions,	economists	often	suppose,	will	tend	toward	equilibria	in	which	each	
participant	is	making	the	best	choice	for	herself	that	she	can	given	the	choices	of	
everyone	else.	Thus	economists	are	often	more	comfortable	making	welfare	
assessments	ex	post	rather	than	ex	ante.	But	both	nudging	and	boosting	depend	on	ex	
ante	evaluations.	Second,	economists	distinguish	between	welfare,	a	technical	concept	
of	their	own	construction	that	is	by	definition	subjective,	but	for	which	they	have	a	well-
stocked	and	venerable	analytical	tool-kit,	from	well-being,	a	broader	but	vaguer	idea	on	
which	philosophers	have	long	tolerated	and	indeed	fostered	disagreement.		
Economists	who	emphasize	the	‘positive’	nature	of	their	enterprise,	such	as	
Friedman	(1953),	might	simply	assert	that	the	merits	or	downsides	of	nudging	and	
boosting	are	none	of	their	concern	ex	ante,	just	as	with	all	other	normative	questions.	
However,	over	the	past	couple	of	decades	this	has	become	a	minority	stance	within	the	
discipline.	Leamer	(2012)	stresses	that	most	economists	think	that	theirs	is	policy-
driven	inquiry,	in	the	strong	sense	that	the	hierarchy	of	interesting	problems	largely	
derives	from	the	practical	requirements	of	the	businesses,	governments,	and	
households	that	seek	their	advice.	The	majority	of	economic	inquiry	is	not	basic	
research	but	is	commissioned	by	clients	seeking	assistance	in	policy	selection	and	
design.		
A	more	common	view	is	that	intervention	to	modify	a	target	person’s	behavior	
can	be	acceptable	paternalism	when	it	corrects	(and	merely	corrects)	for	failures	of	the	
target’s	rationality,3	while	any	proposal	for	intervention	that	imposes	normative	
																																																								
3	Le	Grand	&	New	(2015)	philosophically	analyze	government,	as	opposed	to	private,	
paternalism,	and	refer	more	broadly	to	corrections	of	“judgment”	rather	than	
corrections	of	‘rationality.’	We	endorse	their	semantic	preference.	However,	in	the	
context	where	we	are	characterizing	views	common	among,	specifically,	economists,	
‘rationality’	is	the	more	accurate	term.	Le	Grand	&	New	(2015)	defend	the	normative	
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judgments	about	the	best	way	to	live	that	the	target	might	not	share	faces	a	prima	facie	
obligation	to	morally	justify	the	specific	usurpation	of	the	target’s	autonomy.	This	is	the	
approach	of	some	behavioral	welfare	theorists,	such	as	Bernheim	&	Rangel	(2008)	and	
Bernheim	(2016)	who	argue	for	appeal	to	psychological	facts	about	targets	to	ensure	
that	when	the	economist’s	advice	implies	over-ruling	a	target’s	immediate	preference,	
there	is	good	reason	to	believe	that	the	target’s	ex	post	preference	will	accord	with	the	
judgment	implied	by	the	advice.	For	example,	if	a	person’s	behavior	exhibits	conflict	
between	wanting	to	smoke	and	wanting	to	break	the	addiction,	policy	should	side	with	
the	latter	preference	because,	as	a	matter	of	psychological	fact,	few	if	any	ex-smokers	
regret	having	quit,	while	most	continuing	smokers	regret	their	recurrent	lapses	of	
willpower.4	These	kinds	of	situations	involving	intrapersonal	conflict	and	ambivalence	
are	sometimes	thought	to	mark	the	generic	enabling	conditions	for	acceptable	nudging.	
Where	they	do	not	apply,	the	view	would	elaborate,	we	should	try	to	change	people	only	
by	teaching	(or	transparently	incentivizing)	them,	not	by	manipulating	them:	that	is,	we	
should	boost	(or	hire),	not	nudge.	
We	are	concerned	with	the	distinction	between	nudging	and	boosting	as	it	
applies	to	what	we	believe	to	be	a	representative	context	of	commissioned	economic	
research.	What	we	show	is	that	the	economist’s	need	to	operate	with	a	technically	
precise	model	of	the	information	built	into	the	utility	functions	assigned	to	agents	
exposes	problematic	simplifications	in	the	way	in	which	the	nudging	versus	boosting	
distinction	is	normatively	interpreted.	The	behavioral	welfare	theorist’s	suggested	
meta-policy	fails	to	give	the	economist	helpful	advice	in	the	most	common	sorts	of	
policy	situations	of	practical	interest.	
We	emphasize	our	methodological	focus	on	practical	issues	that	arise	for	applied	
economists,	as	opposed	to	philosophical	issues	that	dominate	abstract	debates.	
Philosophical	discussions,	as	in	Hausman	(2011),	often	proceed,	for	understandable	
																																																																																																																																																																												
thesis	that	justification	of	paternalism	requires	identification	of	a	correctible	judgment.	
We	conjecture	that	most	economists	could	be	persuaded	without	much	strain	to	agree	
that	substituting	the	broader	concept	of	judgment	for	a	narrower	concept	of	rationality	
would	respect	their	normative	concerns.	However,	incorporating	that	adjustment	here	
would	both	require	a	distracting	foray	into	wider	issues	in	the	philosophy	of	economics,	
and	gratuitously	complicate	our	focus	on	the	interrelationship	between	economists’	
normative	assumptions	and	the	technical	resources	they	use	in	welfare	analyses.	
4	The	idea	here	is	not	that	preferences	over	options	arising	later	in	time	should	
generally	be	regarded	as	dominating	preferences	over	options	arising	earlier	in	time.	
The	proposal	of	Bernheim	and	Rangel	(2008)	is	that	the	welfare	analyst	should	search	
for	a	choice	environment	in	which	the	target	agent’s	preferences	are	consistent.	Earlier	
or	later	time	slices	of	the	agent’s	biography,	drawn	from	environments	in	which	
consistency	is	violated,	are	treated	as	preferences	of	other	agents.	The	welfare	analyst	
then	recommends	any	Pareto-consistent	policies,	applied	to	the	community	of	sub-
agents,	that	she	can	find.	This	of	course	allows	for,	indeed	predicts,	situations	in	which	
no	recommendation	between	some	alternative	policies	is	favored.	Bernheim	(2016,	p.	
14)	defends	this	unambitious	program,	with	its	ad	hoc	reliance	on	case-specific	
psychological	hypotheses	rather	than	general	economic	theory,	on	the	grounds	that	
structural	models	generally	make	overly	strong	assumptions	that	have	“little	basis.”	We	
submit	that	the	case	study	we	consider	stands	as	a	quite	typical	counter-example	to	this	
defeatist	stance,	as	does	Harrison	and	Ng	(2016),	which	we	also	discuss	below.	
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reasons,	by	considering	the	implications	of	conceptual	distinctions	for	idealized,	general,	
or	hypothetical	cases,	set	up	so	as	to	push	pragmatic	‘side	issues’	into	the	background.	
We	are	not	directly	engaging	the	debate	at	that	level	of	abstraction.	Thus	we	should	not	
be	interpreted	as	trying	to	argue	that	nudging	and	boosting	are	conceptually	
indistinguishable.	It	is	clear	enough	that	changing	people’s	behavior	by	altering	its	
context	and	changing	their	behavior	by	teaching	them	new	cognitive	skills	are	not	in	
general	the	same	kind	of	thing,	and	that	this	difference	is	significant	where	concerns	
about	paternalism	arise.	Our	point,	instead,	will	be	to	illuminate	complexities	that	arise	
for	this	philosophically	clear-enough	distinction	when	it	is	exported	from	its	home	
territory	in	purely	normative	policy	and	meta-policy	debates,	into	an	everyday	domain	
of	economic	engineering.	In	this	domain,	normative	and	technical	considerations	are	
typically	tightly	entangled,	as	we	illustrate.	We	argue	that	a	meta-policy,	according	to	
which	boosting	is	morally	unproblematic,	while	nudging	proposals	must	always	be	
accompanied	by	responses	to	concerns	about	paternalism,	is	awkwardly	adapted	to	the	
front	line	of	applied	economics.	If	we	see	economics	as	largely	a	policy	science,	a	form	of	
institutional	engineering,	then	economists	cannot	simply	refuse	to	engage	with	
normative	complexities.	But	Leamer	(2012)	also	reminds	us	that	philosophical	
distinctions	developed	in	vivo	need	to	be	examined	in	situ	if	they	are	to	be	made	fully	
relevant	to	economists.	
We	conduct	this	exercise	by	describing	a	recent	consulting	project	we	carried	out	
for	a	large	South	African	retailer	of	investment	products,	and	asking	whether	what	we	
were	doing	for	our	client	was	helping	them	nudge	their	customers	or	helping	them	
boost	those	customers.	We	also	ask	where	any	potential	moral	issues	of	interest	arise,	
and	for	which	parties.	Crucially,	our	exercise	was	not	designed	to	be	a	test-bed	for	
conceptual	or	normative	issues.	Equally	importantly,	the	advice	we	based	on	it,	if	
implemented	by	the	client,	will	have	real	consequences	for	individuals	and	households.	
In	Section	2	we	describe	the	commissioned	experimental	research	that	we	
conducted,	and	the	advice	we	were	asked	to	provide	on	the	basis	of	it.	Section	3	
motivates	the	analyses	we	performed	on	the	data,	and	the	results	we	obtained.		Section	
4	pulls	the	preceding	strands	together	and	gives	the	argument	for	the	main	
methodological	conclusions.		
Although	we	have	stressed	that	we	are	not	engaged	in	first-order	philosophical	
investigation	into	the	idealized	concepts	of	nudging	and	boosting,	we	believe	that	
debates	drawn	from	the	philosophy	of	mind	and	agency	can	shed	diagnostic	light	on	the	
difficulties	encountered	in	translating	welfare	theory	into	policy-focused	practice.	This	
diagnosis	is	outlined	in	our	concluding	Section	5.	
	.	
2.	Helping	Investment	Product	Retailers	Give	Better	Customer	Advice	
In	2014	we	accepted	a	commission	for	research	from	a	major	South	African	
retailer5	of	household	investment	products,	which	are	primarily	mutual	funds	in	
																																																								
5	Our	not	naming	the	company	is	part	of	a	general	policy	observed	here	of	censoring	
information	that	explicitly	or	implicitly	reveals	commercially	valuable	results	of	our	research	
furnished	to	our	client.	This	precludes	our	describing	any	results	in	terms	of	monetary	
magnitudes.	
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American	terminology.	The	company’s	motivation	in	commissioning	the	research	began	
from	its	observation,	nearly	universal	in	the	industry,	of	many	clients	buying	products	
that	were	sensible	investments,	given	the	clients’	stated	savings	and	earnings	goals,	
only	assuming	tolerance	for	pre-specifiable	ranges	and	average	durations	of	decline	in	
net	product	value,	and	then	selling	back	the	products,	or	compounding	losses	by	
churning	their	portfolio	elements,	upon	encountering	the	predicted	episodes	of	decline.	
The	company	hoped	to	reduce	the	extent	of	this	behavior.	In	general,	a	company	can	
seldom	expect	to	maximize	its	sales	volumes,	customer	base,	or	brand	reputation	if	
many	of	its	customers	systematically	fail	to	derive	full	value	from	its	products	due	to	
misuse.	Investment	portfolios	can	be	unusual	where	this	relationship	is	concerned,	
however,	because	volumes	of	commissions	to	providers	and	their	agents	are	typically	
driven	up,	rather	than	down,	when	clients	over-churn.	This	incentive	to	encourage,	or	
not	fully	discourage,	client	over-activity	is	countered	by	losses	of	business	when	
disappointed	clients	withdraw	their	funds	altogether.	Over-churning	by	large	
proportions	of	clients	can	in	extreme	cases	disrupt	the	performance	metrics	on	a	
company’s	funds.	We	had	no	access	to	our	client’s	accounts,	so	we	cannot	comment	on	
the	mixture	of	self-interest	and	social	responsibility	in	its	motivations	for	wishing	to	see	
more	of	its	customers	behave	in	a	way	that	optimized	their	expected	returns.	But	given	
the	prominence	of	our	client’s	brand,	we	would	be	surprised	if	social	responsibility	
were	not	a	relevant	factor.	
The	company	hypothesized	that	its	customers	might	show	greater	resilience	
during	periods	of	portfolio	value	decline	if,	when	they	chose	their	portfolios,	they	were	
presented	with	richer	information	about	the	histories	of	net	value	movements	in	the	set	
of	alternative	products,	formatted	in	a	way	thought	to	correspond	to	widespread	
patterns	of	cognitive	adaptedness.6	The	need	for	us	to	guard	our	client’s	intellectual	
property	limits	the	extent	of	detail	with	which	we	can	describe	this	informational	
intervention.	However,	we	can	say	enough	to	locate	the	intervention	in	terms	of	the	
distinction	between	nudging	and	boosting.	The	client’s	customers,	when	meeting	with	a	
broker	to	choose	portfolios,	were	typically	told	only	about	options’	probable	long-run	
rates	of	return	on	initial	investment,	maximum	expected	‘drawdown’	(lowest	value	
likely	to	be	visited	by	the	asset’s	value	walk),	and	historical	standard	deviation.	This	
allowed	for	a	crude,	qualitative	operationalization	of	‘risk	aversion’:	if	a	customer	
indicated	discomfort	with	the	maximum	expected	drawdown,	they	would	be	advised	to	
opt	for	a	portfolio	with	lower	variance	at	the	expense	of	a	more	modest	expected	long-
run	return.	The	client’s	‘education	intervention,’	which	we	were	asked	to	
experimentally	test,	provided	clients	with	online	charts	showing	fill	histories	of	
portfolios	under	consideration.	These	showed	historical	variance	in	the	strict	sense,	
along	with	skew	and	kurtosis	in	distributions	of	returns.	Furthermore,	the	information	
site	was	interactive	so	that	the	customer	could	retrieve	definitions	and	brief	
explanations	of	the	risk-related	portfolio	properties	displayed.	The	intervention	
included	no	simple	heuristics	or	motivating	messages,	of	the	kind	which	Ambuehl,	
Bernheim	and	Lusardi	(2014)	found	under	some	circumstances	can	lead	retail	investors	
to	choose	less	optimally	(with	respect	to	their	subjective	utility)	than	if	they	are	
provided	with	objective	information	only.		
																																																								
6	'Adaptedness'	refers	in	evolutionary	psychology	to	pre-adapted	dispositions	a	subject	
brings	to	a	task.	
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Our	research	consisted	in	designing,	administering,	and	analyzing	a	controlled	
trial	of	a	prototype	of	the	intervention.	The	client	believed	that	most	customers	they	
perceived	as	‘rational,’	in	the	sense	that	they	did	not	prematurely	sell	their	portfolios	or	
over-churn,	would	be	annoyed	and	discouraged	by	the	time	involved	in	experiencing	
the	intervention,	and	might	find	the	explanatory	notes	condescending.	The	client	
therefore	wanted	to	identify	demographic	characteristics	of	potential	customers	that	
could	predict	which	subsets	of	the	customer	base	were	likely	to	benefit	from	the	
intervention.	We	brought	to	the	client’s	attention	that	scientifically	estimated	risk	
preference	structures,	which	we	could	elicit	in	an	experiment,	might	prove	to	be	at	least	
as	informative	as	demographic	properties.	The	client	agreed	that	our	experiment	should	
explore	this	aspect.	
Our	specific	research	design	involved	a	sample	of	193	subjects,	who	for	reasons	
of	convenience	related	to	budget	constraints	were	employees	of	the	University	of	Cape	
Town	(UCT).	For	each	subject	we	estimated	their	aversion	to	risk,	and	then	assigned	
them	randomly	to	one	of	two	investment	treatments.		
Risk	attitudes	were	measured	by	evaluating	a	series	of	choices	by	each	subject	
between	pairs	of	lotteries	that	had	an	average	yield	of	300	South	African	Rand	(R300,	
which	exchanged	for	about	US$27	at	the	time	of	the	experiment).	In	this	Lottery	Task,	
50	pairs	of	lotteries	were	chosen	at	random	from	a	set	of	100	pairs	and	presented	to	the	
subjects	sequentially	on	computer	screens	in	the	form	of	pie	charts,	illustrated	in	Figure	
1.	The	subjects	were	asked	to	choose	one	lottery	from	each	pair	by	clicking	on	the	
corresponding	button	below	their	preferred	lottery.	One	of	the	50	choices	was	selected	
at	random	for	realization	and	payment.	
[Figure	1	about	here]	
The	data	generated	by	performance	of	this	task	allowed	us	to	estimate	the	
structures	of	risk	preferences	for	each	subject.	Lottery	tasks	similar	to	the	ones	
employed	here	have	been	used	to	estimate	risk	preferences	for	individuals,	typically	
using	maximum	likelihood	estimation	in	the	spirit	of	Hey	&	Orme	(1994)	and	Harrison	
&	Ng	(2016).	
In	the	Investment	Task,	each	subject	chose	simulated	investment	funds	
modeled	on	products	available	in	the	South	African	market,	and	received	payment	
based	on	the	simulated	performance	of	the	fund	they	chose.	Subjects	in	the	control	
treatment	received	names	of	investment	funds	with	basic	information	on	each	fund:	
investment	objective,	return	history,	standard	deviation,	and	maximum	drawdown.	
Subjects	in	the	treatment	group	were	additionally	provided	with	the	‘education	
intervention.’	
To	avoid	uncontrolled	interaction	between	laboratory	objects	and	subjects’	
varying	knowledge	of	real-world	objects,	we	designed	simulated	funds	based	on	the	
principle	that	informed	the	original	design	of	mutual	funds	available	to	retail	consumers	
in	South	Africa.	We	coined	names	for	the	simulated	funds	that	mimic	those	used	by	their	
providers.	The	expected	performance	of	each	simulated	fund	was	based	stochastically	
on	the	historical	performance	and	volatility	of	the	real	funds	that	furnished	their	models.	
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The	simulated	market	was	designed	to	be	moderately	bullish,	such	that	the	average	
take-home	per	subject	from	this	part	of	the	study	would	be	R250.7		
In	the	Investment	Task	subjects	were	endowed	with	R65	and	presented	with	8	
possible	simulated	funds	in	which	they	could	invest	their	endowment.	Each	of	these	8	
funds	represented	an	approximation	to	a	financial	product	to	which	subjects	could	
potentially	have	access	through	a	brokerage.	Each	simulated	fund	was	a	discretized	
lottery	of	the	continuous	distribution	of	historical	returns	associated	with	the	real-life	
counterpart	of	the	simulated	fund	in	question.	The	8	simulated	funds	were	composed	of	
4	types:	high	equity,	medium	equity,	low	equity,	and	interest	bearing.	There	were	two	
simulated	funds	per	group	in	the	choice	set,	representing	the	existence	of	competing	
products	in	the	actual	marketplace.	
Before	the	subjects	made	any	choices	in	this	task,	it	was	explained	that	the	task	
involved	choosing	an	investment	portfolio	that	would	be	played	out	against	a	simulated	
market.	This	market	was	represented	by	the	50,000	possible	states	of	the	world	to	
which	the	real-world	funds	were	mapped	in	discrete	intervals.	Subjects	were	told	that,	
for	practical	reasons,	one	of	these	50,000	states	would	be	randomly	selected	to	calculate	
their	investment	earnings	for	their	experimental	session	before	they	had	made	the	
choices	for	this	task.	Die-rolling	by	subjects	was	used	to	select	one	of	the	simulated	
markets.	
	
The	task	started	with	a	screen	explaining	that	a	certain	amount	of	money	was	to	
be	invested	in	one	or	more	funds.	The	different	types	of	funds	were	explained,	but	
without	details	on	their	potential	returns.	Those	in	the	treatment	group	were	then	
presented	with	the	interactive	‘education	intervention’	that	allowed	exploration	of	the	
histories	of	the	funds,	in	formats	hypothesized	to	be	cognitively	accessible.		Subjects	in	
both	the	treatment	and	control	groups	were	then	allowed	to	allocate	their	endowments	
to	funds,	and	everyone	saw	some	base	level	of	information	about	the	potential	fund	
returns:	the	expected	3-year	and	5-year	returns,	the	standard	deviation	of	yearly	
returns,	and	the	maximum	drawdown	of	each	fund.	Subjects	were	asked	to	invest	in	as	
many	funds	as	they	wanted.	
	
After	each	subject	had	completed	all	of	their	experimental	tasks,	a	research	
assistant	tallied	their	earnings	on	a	record	sheet	and	then	privately	paid	them	in	cash.		
	
3.	Analytical	Methods	and	Results	
Idealized	discussions	of	welfare	and	of	economic	policy	have,	at	least	until	the	
recent	emergence	of	the	behavioral	literature,	taken	the	Expected	Utility	Theory	(EUT)	
of	Savage	(1954)	to	provide	the	basic	technical	apparatus	for	normatively	comparing	
alternative	states	of	the	world	for	an	agent.	Binmore	(2009)	provides	an	authoritative	
updating,	with	suitable	cautions	against	hubristic	over-extension,	of	this	theoretical	
landmark	in	the	context	of	contemporary	operationalization.		
																																																								
7	Subjects	also	made	predictions	of	future	events,	indicating	their	degrees	of	confidence	
in	their	predictions,	and	were	rewarded	with	cash	payments	of	up	to	R100	when	their	
predictions	were	correct,	with	rewards	reduced	commensurately	with	subjects’	
confidence	levels.	Analysis	of	the	results	of	this	task	will	not	figure	in	the	discussion	
here,	so	we	pass	over	design	details.	
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Behavioral	economists	often	interpret	their	work	as	motivating	revisions	to,	or,	
for	those	who	favor	rhetorics	of	disruption,	paradigm	replacements	for,	EUT.	Among	
various	formal	models	of	choice	under	risk	or	uncertainty	that	are	contrasted	with	EUT,	
the	Cumulative	Prospect	Theory	(CPT)	of	Tversky	and	Kahneman	(1992)	has	received	
the	most	attention.	A	common	strategy	in	both	theoretical	and	applied	behavioral	
economics	has	been	to	run	‘horse	races’	between	EUT	and	CPT	or	another	alternative	as	
rival	models	for	estimating	a	specific	data	set,	and	urging	that	the	winner	of	the	race,	
that	is,	the	model	that	yields	the	best	fitting	estimation,	should	then	be	used	as	the	basis	
for	empirical	interpretation.	Such	horse	races	stack	the	deck	against	EUT	when,	as	is	
almost	always	the	case,	the	other	horse	has	greater	structural	complexity	and	observed	
behavior	is	economically	heterogeneous	(Ross	2005,	pp.	174-176).	When	an	
investigator	following	this	approach	concludes	that	EUT	is	the	‘losing’	contender	with	
respect	to	empirical	estimation,	the	question	remains	open	about	how	to	proceed	to	
normative	analysis.	An	economist	who	follows	Savage	(1954)	in	thinking	that	EUT	is	the	
normatively	correct	model	of	‘rational’	decision,	regardless	of	the	extent	to	which	real	
human	choice	conforms	to	it,	might	analyze	agents’	welfare	against	the	outcomes	they	
would	have	obtained	had	EUT	correctly	characterized	their	behavior.	Alternatively,	one	
might	employ	the	latent	utility	function	embedded	in	a	more	elaborate	model	of	risk	
preferences,	as	proposed	by	Bleichrodt	et	al	(2001).	
Following	recent	theoretical	advances	summarized	in	Harrison	and	Rutström	
(2008),	the	technical	apparatus	used	to	analyze	the	experiment	we	discuss	goes	beyond	
this	‘horse	race’	methodology.	It	reflects	advances	in	understanding	of	the	relationship	
between	CPT	and	other	alternatives	to	EUT	as	descriptive	models	of	choice	estimated	at	
the	level	of	individuals.	
Define	the	risk	premium	as	the	difference	between	the	actuarial	expected	value	
of	a	risky	prospect	and	the	certain	amount	of	money	an	individual	would	accept	in	
exchange	for	giving	it	up.	Assume	there	is	no	bargaining	process	causing	the	individual	
to	strategically	mis-state	this	certainty	equivalent	if	asked	for	it	directly	or	indirectly.	
We	consider	two	core	models	of	decision-making	under	objective	risk.	One	is	
EUT,8	and	posits	that	the	risk	premium	is	explained	solely	by	an	aversion	to	variability	
of	earnings	from	a	prospect.	The	second	is	the	Rank-Dependent	Utility	(RDU)	model	of	
Quiggin	(1982),	which	further	posits	that	decision-makers	may	be	pessimistic	or	
optimistic	with	respect	to	the	probabilities	of	outcomes.	RDU	does	not	rule	out	aversion	
to	variability	of	earnings,	but	augments	it	with	an	additional	psychological	process.	The	
process	may	be	‘latent’	or	‘virtual’	in	the	sense	associated	with	Dennett’s	(1987)	
																																																								
8	We	consider	decision	making	under	objective	risk	because	all	of	our	methodological	
points	can	be	made	in	that	setting.	An	important	extension	would	be	to	consider	risk	
preferences	under	subjective	risk,	using	either	Subjective	Expected	Utility	or	some	
models	that	allow	for	uncertainty	aversion	when	individuals	do	not	apply	the	Reduction	
of	Compound	Lotteries	axiom	to	subjective	probability	distributions.	In	that	latter	case	
some	aspect	of	the	distribution,	other	than	the	average,	matters	for	decisions:	see	
Harrison	(2011;	§4).	Models	that	allow	for	ambiguity	aversion	when	individuals	do	not	
even	have	well-formed	subjective	probability	distributions	could	also	be	considered,	
but	this	would	raise	many	additional	issues	of	positive	and	normative	methodology	well	
beyond	our	immediate	remit.	
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intentional	stance;9	that	is,	it	might	not	refer	to	a	specific	physical	computation	‘in	a	
person’s	head,’	but	to	an	equivalence	class	of	relationships	between	decision	contexts	
and	observed	choices.	Both	EUT	and	RDU	assume	that	individuals	asset	integrate,	in	the	
sense	that	they	net	out	framed	losses	from	some	endowment.	
We	do	not	estimate	our	data	using	CPT.	Our	avoidance	of	CPT	is	based	on	
analysis	of	its	relationship	to	RDU,	both	theoretically	and	in	application	to	empirical	
data.	Harrison	&	Swarthout	(2016)	provide	an	extensive	literature	review,	which	finds	
that	most	reported	evidence	for	‘loss	aversion’	is	actually	evidence	for	probability	
weighting.		They	also	report	evidence	of	(at	least	local)	asset	integration	in	the	
laboratory,	which	is	fatal	for	empirical	adequacy	of	CPT.	Harrison	and	Ross	(2017)	
review	further	evidence,	and	consider	the	implications	for	welfare	assessment	of	the	
conjecture	that	the	many	reported	‘horse	race’	victories	of	CPT	over	EUT	were	really	
wins	for	RDU	in	disguise,	where	CPT’s	successes	stemmed	from	its	allowance	for	
probability	weighting	rather	than	‘utility’	loss	aversion	relative	to	an	idiosyncratic	
reference	point.	We	thus	focus	on	EUT	and	RDU.	
We	begin	with	EUT.	Assume	that	utility	of	income	is	defined	by	a	utility	function	
U(x),	where	x	is	the	lottery	prize.	Under	EUT	the	probabilities	for	each	outcome	xj,	p(xj),	
are	those	induced	by	the	experimenter,	so	expected	utility	is	the	probability	weighted	
utility	of	each	outcome	in	each	lottery.	Once	the	utility	function	is	estimated,	risk	
aversion	is	measured.	The	concept	of	risk	aversion	traditionally	refers	to	‘diminishing	
marginal	utility,’	which	is	driven	by	the	curvature	of	the	utility	function,	which	is	in	turn	
given	by	the	second	derivative	of	the	utility	function.	Although	loose,	this	can	be	viewed	
as	characterizing	individuals	that	are	averse	to	mean-preserving	increases	in	the	
variance	of	returns.	We	assume	that	utility	of	income	reflects	constant	relative	risk	
aversion	(CRRA),	defined	by	U(x)	=	x(1-r)/(1-r)	where	x	is	a	lottery	prize	and	r≠1	is	a	
parameter	to	be	estimated.	Then	r	is	the	coefficient	of	CRRA	for	an	EUT	individual:	r=0	
corresponds	to	risk	neutrality,	r<0	to	a	risk	loving	attitude,	and	r>0	to	risk	aversion.	
	 The	RDU	model	extends	EUT	by	allowing	for	decision	weights	on	lottery	
outcomes.	These	decision	weights	reflect	probability	weights	on	objective	probabilities.	
The	decision	weights	are	defined	after	ranking	the	prizes	from	largest	to	smallest.	The	
largest	prize	receives	a	decision	weight	equal	to	the	weighted	probability	for	that	prize:	
the	decision	weight	reflects	the	probability	weight	of	getting	at	least	that	prize.	The	
decision	weight	on	the	second	largest	prize	is	the	probability	weight	of	getting	at	least	
that	second	largest	prize,	minus	the	decision	weight	of	getting	the	highest	prize.	
Similarly	for	other	prizes.	
	
Subjects’	risk	preferences	were	analysed	based	on	the	Lottery	Task.	Again,	we	
conducted	analysis	based	on	the	assumption	that	each	subject’s	behavior	was	either	
best	characterized	by	EUT	or	by	RDU.	When	a	subject	was	estimated	to	be	an	RDU	agent,	
we	tested	further	to	determine	which	of	several	probability	weighting	functions	best	
characterized	the	pessimism	or	optimism	about	probabilities.	
We	consider	three	popular	probability	weighting	functions.	The	first	is	the	
‘power’	probability	weighting	function	with	curvature	parameter	γ:	γ(p)	=	pγ.	So	γ	≠1	is	
																																																								
9	The	intentional	stance	is	discussed	in	Section	5.	
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consistent	with	a	deviation	from	the	conventional	EUT	representation.10	The	second	
probability	weighting	function	is	the	‘inverse-S’	function:	ω(p)	=	pϒ	/	(	pγ	+	(1-p)	γ	)1/Υ.	
This	function	exhibits	inverse-S	probability	weighting	(optimism	for	small	p,	and	
pessimism	for	large	p)	for	γ<1,	and	S-shaped	probability	weighting	(pessimism	for	small	
p,	and	optimism	for	large	p)	for	γ>1.	The	third	probability	weighting	function	is	a	
general	functional	form	proposed	by	Prelec	(1998)	that	exhibits	considerable	flexibility.	
This	function	is	ω(p)	=	exp{-η(-ln	p)φ}	and	is	defined	for	0<p≤1,	η	>0	and	φ	>0.		The	
RDU	agent	is	also	assumed	to	have	a	CRRA	utility	function	with	parameter	r.	
We	can	use	the	results	from	a	specific	subject	to	illustrate	the	type	of	risk	
preferences	estimated.	Consider	subject	#22.	We	first	determine	if	subject	#22	should	
be	classified	as	an	EUT	or	RDU	decision-maker.	The	log-likelihood	value	calculated	for	
the	best	RDU	model	(-27.0)	is	better	than	the	log-likelihood	of	the	EUT	model	(-28.9),	so	
the	subject	would	be	classified	as	RDU	with	Prelec	probability	weighting	function	by	
this	metric.	The	difference	in	log-likelihoods,	however,	is	numerically	quite	small.	Once	
we	test	for	the	subject	being	EUT,	the	null	hypothesis	that	ω(p)	=	p	cannot	be	rejected	at	
the	5%	or	1%	significance	level,	since	the	p-value	is	0.099;	it	would	be	rejected	at	the	
10%	level.	Thus	the	classification	of	this	subject	depends	on	the	significance	level	used,	
following	Harrison	and	Ng	(2016).	
If	the	sole	metric	for	deciding	if	a	subject	was	better	characterised	by	EUT	or	
RDU	were	the	log-likelihood	of	the	estimated	model,	then	there	would	be	virtually	no	
subjects	classified	as	EUT	since	RDU	nests	EUT.	But	if	we	use	metrics	of	10%,	5%	or	1%	
significance	levels	on	the	test	of	the	EUT	hypothesis,	then	we	classify	50%,	57%	or	67%,	
respectively,	of	our	193	subjects	with	valid	estimates	as	being	EUT-consistent.	Figure	2	
displays	these	results	using	the	5%	significance	level.	The	left	panel	shows	a	kernel	
density	of	the	193	p-values	estimated	for	each	individual	and	the	EUT	hypothesis	test	
that	ω(p)	=	p;	we	use	the	best-fitting	RDU	variant	for	each	subject.	The	vertical	lines	
show	the	1%,	5%	and	10%	p-values,	so	that	one	can	see	that	subjects	to	the	right	of	
these	lines	would	be	classified	as	being	EUT-consistent.	The	right	panel	shows	the	
specific	allocation	using	the	representative	5%	threshold.	So	5%	of	the	density	in	the	
left	panel	of	Figure	2	corresponds	to	the	right	of	the	middle	vertical	line	at	5%.		
[Figure	2	about	here]	
We	now	turn	to	the	data	generated	by	the	Investment	Task.	Our	aim	in	the	
analysis	of	subjects’	investment	choices	was	to	identify	whether	the	information	
provided	under	the	treatment,	our	client’s	education	intervention,	had	a	significant	
effect	in	reducing	what	we	refer	to,	and	described	to	our	client	as,	subjects’	‘welfare	loss.’		
The	significance	of	this	interpretation	of	the	analysis	will	be	critically	revisited	below.		
We	made	it	explicit	to	our	client	that	we	viewed	welfare	loss	as	the	difference	
between	the	certainty	equivalents	of	the	optimal	portfolio	conditional	on	risk	
preferences	and	the	certainty	equivalent	of	the	actual	portfolio	chosen.	The	certainty	
equivalent	(CE)	is	the	certain,	non-risky	return	that	is	equivalent	in	terms	of	a	subject’s	
subjective	utility	to	the	expected	utility	or	(alternatively,	depending	on	the	subject)	
																																																								
10	Convexity	of	the	probability	weighting	function,	when	γ>1,	is	said	to	reflect	
‘pessimism’	and	generates,	if	one	assumes,	for	simplicity,	a	‘linear’	utility	function,	a	risk	
premium	since	ω(p)	<	p		for	all	p	and	hence	the	RDU	expected	value	(EV)	weighted	by	
ω(p)	instead	of	p	has	to	be	less	than	the	EV	weighted	by	p.	
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rank-dependent	utility	of	the	risky	return.	We	used	the	estimated	expected	utility	or	
rank-dependent	functionals	for	each	subject	to	calculate	the	CE.	This	approach	to	
welfare	evaluation	follows	Harrison	and	Ng	(2016).11		
In	estimating	portfolio	optima,	we	used	a	bootstrapping	method,	which	we	made	
less	computationally	intensive	by	optimizing	over	a	grid	of	parameter	values	intended	
to	map	the	range	of	feasible	estimates,	and	then	interpolating	the	bootstrapping	
procedure.	Based	on	the	distribution	of	point	estimates	of	parameters,	taking	into	
account	standard	errors,	we	optimize	portfolio	allocations	for	the	following	parameter	
values:	EUT:	r	=	(0,	0.05,	0.1,	…,	2,	2.5,	3,	3.5);	RDU	Power:	r	=	(-10,	-5,	-3,	-2,	-1,	0,	0.1,	
0.2,	…,	1,	1.25,	1.5)	and	γ	=	(0.2,	0.7,	1.2,	…,	3.2,	4,	5);	RDU	Inverse-S:	r	=	(-10,	-5,	-3,	-2,	-1,	
0,	0.2,	0.4,	…,	1.6)	and	γ	=	(0.3,	0.4,	0.5,	…,	1.1);	RDU	Prelec:	r	=	(-10,	-5,	-3,	-2,	-1,	0,	0.25,	
0.5,	…,	2),	η	=	(0.3,	0.8,	1.3,	…,	2.8),	and	φ	=	(0.5,	0.7,	0.9,	1.1,	2,	3).	 	
Figure	3	displays	the	risk-return	tradeoff	from	the	simulated	funds	in	the	
investment	task.	The	return	is	the	average	of	the	annualized	returns	on	the	fund,	and	
the	risk	is	the	standard	deviation	of	the	annualized	returns	on	the	fund.	The	returns	
here	come	from	50,000	simulations	of	fund	performance,	based	on	historical	data	on	
returns.	We	observe	that	for	higher	average	returns	the	investor	must	be	willing	to	take	
on	greater	risk,	which	is	no	surprise.	But	in	some	cases	the	extra	return	only	entails	a	
minimal	increase	in	risk:	for	instance,	compare	the	X123	Equity	fund	with	the	ABC	Multi	
High	fund.	The	evaluation	of	these	increments	in	risk,	exchanged	for	increments	in	
return,	depends	on	the	attitude	to	risk	of	the	investor,	if	we	assume	that	the	subjective	
risk	perceptions	of	the	investor	match	these	historical	returns.	
For	each	of	the	high,	medium	and	low	equity	asset	classes,	the	historical	
performance	of	a	mutual	fund	in	each	class	was	derived	from	returns	for	the	whole	
asset	class.12	The	second	funds	in	each	of	the	high	and	medium	equity	classes	were	
simulations	of	real	funds	traded	in	the	South	African	market.	For	the	low	equity	fund,	
historical	performance	of	the	fund	was	equated	to	the	historical	inflation	movement	
																																																								
11	Bleichrodt	et	al	(2001)	maintain	that	EUT	is	the	appropriate	normative	model,	and	
correctly	note	that	if	an	individual	is	an	RDU	or	CPT	decision-maker,	then	recovering	
the	utility	function	from	observed	lottery	choices	requires	allowing	for	probability	
weighting	and/or	sign-dependence.	They	then	implicitly	propose	using	that	utility	
function	to	infer	the	certainty	equivalent	using	EUT.	These	are	radically	different	
normative	positions.	Some	notation	will	help	make	this	clear.	Let	RDU(x)	denote	the	
evaluation	of	an	insurance	policy	x	in	Harrison	and	Ng	(2016)	using	the	RDU	risk	
preferences	of	the	individual,	including	the	probability	weighting	function.	They	
calculate	the	certainty-equivalent	CE	by	solving	URDU(CE)	=	RDU(x)	for	CE,	where	URDU	is	
the	utility	function	from	the	RDU	model	of	risk	preferences	for	that	individual.	But	
Bleichrodt	et	al	(2001)	evaluate	the	CE	by	solving	URDU(CE)	=	EUT(x)	where	EUT(x)	uses	
that	utility	function	in	an	EUT	manner,	assuming	no	probability	weighting.		This	strikes	
us	as	normatively	illogical.	The	logical	approach	here	would	be	to	estimate	the	“best	
fitting	EUT	risk	preferences”	for	the	individual	from	their	observed	lottery	choices,	and	
then	use	the	utility	function	UEUT	as	the	basis	for	evaluating	the	CE	using	UEUT(CE)	=	
EUT(x).		
12	We	did	not	group	asset	classes	based	on	subjective	judgment.	They	were	defined	
as	per	Association	for	Savings	and	Investment	South	Africa	categories	used	by	
financial	advisors.	
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plus	5%.	The	interest	bearing	funds	were	derived	from	historical	data	using	the	interest	
bearing	variable	term	funds	and	money	market	funds,	respectively,	also	retailed	in	
South	Africa.		
Month-end	price	data	from	June	2001	to	August	2014	were	used	to	determine	
the	funds’	performance	parameters	such	as	historical	returns	and	standard	deviation	of	
returns.	This	period	included	the	bull	run	of	2006/2007,	the	global	financial	crisis	of	
2007/2008,	and	the	recovery	period	post-2008.	
[Figure	3	about	here]	
	 Figure	4	shows	the	number	of	funds	that	received	some	allocations	of	the	R65	
subjects	had	available	to	invest.	There	is	a	clear	mode	at	2	funds,	with	very	few	subjects	
investing	in	more	than	4	funds.	Relatively	few	subjects	chose	to	invest	all	of	their	money	
in	one	fund.	Of	course,	this	does	not	show	us	whether	the	funds	invested	in	were	
optimal	or	how	sub-optimal	they	were.	
[Figure	4	about	here]	
	 The	optimal	allocation	to	equity	funds	was	relatively	easy	to	characterize.	Using	
the	relative	risk	aversion	(r)	as	a	summary,	descriptive	measure	of	the	risk	premium,	
we	found	that	100%	of	the	endowment	of	R65	would	optimally	have	been	allocated	to	
the	ABC	Company	Equity	Fund	for	all	values	of	r	up	to	0.62,	and	then	that	fraction	
declines	to	about	50%	as	r	approaches	1.	The	residual	is	entirely	the	123	Company	
Equity	Fund.	The	vast	bulk	of	estimates	of	relative	risk	aversion	in	the	laboratory	are	
around	0.65,	with	some	variation	of	course:	see	Harrison	and	Rutström	(2008)	for	a	
survey.	
Figure	5	shows	the	average	allocation	of	investment	funds	to	each	fund,	where	
the	total	that	could	be	invested	was	R65.	We	show	a	vertical	red	line	at	the	50%	mark	
for	reference.13	In	this	display	the	funds	are	ordered	in	terms	of	smallest	(average)	
allocation	to	largest,	so	one	has	to	pay	attention	to	the	names	of	the	funds.	For	the	
averages	we	see	that	the	two	equity	funds	received	the	highest	average	allocation,	but	
that	the	123	Company	Equity	Fund	was	only	the	third	most	popular	in	terms	of	median	
allocations.	
Figure	5	also	displays	the	average	allocations	to	all	funds	in	comparison	to	the	
optimal	allocations.	Since	we	find	that	all	optimal	allocations	should	be	to	the	two	
equity	funds,	we	aggregate	these	funds	and	show	the	optimal	allocation	as	R65,	or	
100%	of	the	portfolio.	The	remaining	funds	should	always	receive	a	zero	allocation.	
Viewed	in	this	light,	and	ignoring	the	optimality	of	the	allocation	within	equity	funds,	
we	can	see	that	the	average	investor	was	making	a	qualitatively	optimal	investment,	
with	the	majority	of	allocations	to	the	equity	funds.	However,	the	level	of	allocations	
falls	short	of	the	optimal	amount	of	R65.	The	distance	between	the	average	observed	
allocations	and	the	optimal	allocations	is	what	generates	the	welfare	losses	we	reported.	
These	distances	only	tell	us	that	there	will	be	a	welfare	loss	on	average:	to	evaluate	the	
significance	of	that	loss	we	evaluated	the	foregone	CE	from	the	observed	portfolios	
compared	to	the	CE	of	the	optimal	portfolio.	
																																																								
13	The	median	allocations	are	close	to	the	average	allocation	except	for	the	Equity	Fund.	
In	that	case	the	median	is	exactly	R32.5,	or	50%	of	the	portfolio.	
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[Figure	5	about	here]	
Each	CE	calculation	uses	50,000	draws	from	the	multivariate	normal	distribution	
underlying	the	simulated	funds.	These	CE	are	conditional	on	estimates	of	the	
parameters	defining	risk	preferences,	and	the	uncertainty	of	the	estimates	is	allowed	
for	by	sampling	500	draws	from	the	joint	parameter	distribution.	The	means	of	these	
500	draws	are	the	parameter	point	estimates	based	on	the	winning	risk	preference	
structure	model	for	the	individual	at	the	5%	significance	level,	and	the	covariance	
matrix	between	the	parameter	estimates.	
Multivariate	normality	of	the	joint	parameter	distribution	is	assumed,	which	is	
potentially	problematic	with	large	standard	errors	for	some	subjects:	very	high	or	low	
estimates	of	probability	weighting	parameters	give	rise	to	implausible	decision	weight	
schemes,	and	very	high	or	low	estimates	of	the	relative	risk	aversion	coefficient	give	
rise	to	numerical	overflow.	Simulated	values	of	risk	preference	parameters	were	
accordingly	constrained	within	the	following	bounds:	EUT:	r	∈	[-5,5];	RDU	Power:	r	∈	[-
10,10],	γ	∈	[0.2,5];	RDU	Inverse-S:	r	∈	[-10,10],	γ	∈	[0.3,3];	RDU	Prelec:	r	∈	[-10,10],	η	∈	
[0.3,3],	φ	∈	[0.3,3].		
Welfare	loss	calculations	could	be	performed	for	174	of	the	193	subjects.	The	
remaining	19	were	those	for	whom	a	winning	model	could	not	be	assigned	because	the	
estimated	coefficient	of	relative	risk	aversion	was	arbitrarily	close	to	one.	Negative	
welfare	losses	are	calculated	in	several	instances,	because	of	the	inaccuracies	of	the	
multilinear	interpolation	method,	giving	rise	to	a	portfolio	which	is	sub-optimal	and	
yielding	a	lower	CE	than	the	actual	allocation	chosen.	
Each	of	the	500	simulations	presents	a	set	of	risk	preference	parameters,	
conditional	on	which	welfare	loss	can	be	calculated.	For	each	of	these	simulations,	a	t-
test	can	reveal	whether	the	mean	welfare	loss	is	significantly	lower	for	the	treatment	
group	than	for	the	control	group.	We	allow	for	the	error	with	which	risk	preference	
parameters	are	estimated	by	performing	the	test	for	each	simulation	and	examining	the	
distribution	of	test	results.	
Figure	6	displays	the	average	welfare	loss,	in	Rand,	for	each	subject	for	which	we	
could	generate	valid	estimates	of	risk	preferences	and	optimal	portfolios	conditional	on	
those	risk	preferences.	Truncating	a	small	fraction	of	welfare	losses	greater	than	R300,	
we	observe	that	the	density	of	welfare	losses	is	much	smaller	under	the	Education	
Intervention	Treatment	than	under	the	Control.	Hence	we	conclude	that	the	Education	
Intervention	Treatment	leads	to	better	decisions	being	made	about	investment	in	this	
setting,	designed	to	mimic,	under	controlled	conditions,	the	natural	setting	in	which	the	
intervention	will	be	applied.	
[Figure	6	about	here]	
Figure	7	shows	that	the	Education	Intervention	Treatment	did	not	generate	a	
greater	dispersion	in	welfare	losses.	This	is	useful	to	know,	since	this	might	have	
mitigated	the	benefits	of	the	reduction	in	the	average	of	welfare	losses.	
[Figure	7	about	here]	
Figures	8	and	9	show	that	the	Education	Intervention	Treatment	had	benefits	for	
both	EUT	and	RDU	decision-makers,	but	that	the	benefits	for	the	RDU	decision-makers	
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are	much	larger.	In	part,	this	is	because	the	RDU	decision-makers	suffered	greater	
welfare	losses	even	in	the	Control.	
It	is	easier	to	evaluate	the	total	and	marginal	effects	of	various	demographics	and	
treatments	using	descriptive	statistical	methods	such	as	a	regression	of	average	welfare	
loss.	When	the	right-hand-side	covariate	is	just	the	demographic	characteristic	or	
treatment	dummy	variable	we	evaluate	the	‘total	effect’	of	the	covariate,	which	is	the	
effect	taking	into	account	all	of	the	correlated	effects	of	covariates	that	also	vary	with	
the	covariate	of	interest.	For	example,	if	women	are	younger	than	men	in	our	sample,	
then	the	total	effect	of	women	will	also	include	any	effect	of	being	a	woman	and	being	
younger.	When	the	right-hand-side	covariates	are	all	demographic	characteristics	and	
treatment	dummy	variables	we	evaluate	the	‘marginal	effect’	of	the	covariate.	Both	total	
effects	and	marginal	effects	are	of	interest,	and	answer	different	questions.	
Figure	10	displays	the	total	effect	of	each	characteristic	and	treatment,	sorted	by	
the	size	of	the	effect.	The	Education	Intervention	Treatment	is	shown	in	bold.	Figure	11	
displays	the	marginal	effect	of	each	characteristic	and	treatment.	In	both	cases	we	see	a	
significant	effect	of	the	Education	Intervention	Treatment	to	reduce	welfare	losses.	We	
also	see,	in	both	cases,	a	significant	effect,	to	increase	welfare	losses,	of	the	subject	being	
classified	as	violating	EUT.	
[Figure	8	about	here]	
	 [Figure	9	about	here]	
	 [Figure	10	about	here]	
	 [Figure	11	here]	
The	average	of	the	difference	in	mean	welfare	loss	between	control	and	
treatment	groups	across	the	500	simulations	is	R57.28	(median	=	R56.23)	with	
standard	deviation	R17.98.	Welfare	loss	was	lower	for	the	treatment	group	in	all	500	
simulations.	A	one-sided	test,	with	the	alternative	hypothesis	being	that	welfare	loss	is	
lower	for	the	treatment	group	than	for	the	control,	yields	a	p-value	<	0.05	in	392	of	the	
500	simulations.	The	p-value	is	<	0.1	for	460	simulations.	
In	our	concluding	advice	to	our	client,	we	emphasized	that	the	value	of	their	
Education	Intervention,	measured	in	terms	of	client	welfare,	would	depend	on	the	
proportion	of	RDU	agents	in	their	customer	population.	As	our	experimental	subject	
pool	was	not	representative	of	this	population,	we	suggested	that	they	might	wish	to	
run	the	Lottery	Task	on	a	large,	randomly	selected	sample	drawn	from	their	client	
demographic.	Generalizing	this	advice,	our	policy-relevant	opinion	is	that	the	expected	
presence	of	significant	numbers	of	people	in	South	Africa	whose	risk	preference	
structure	is	well	characterized	by	an	RDU	structure	is	a	main	source	of	scope	for	
investments	in	education	about	comparative	details	of	portfolio	risk	structures	to	raise	
the	frequency	with	which	South	Africans	reach	retirement	with	savings	that	better	
approximate	available	potentials.	
4.	Are	we	nudging	or	are	we	boosting?	
	 At	first	glance,	the	recommendation	we	made	to	our	client	concerning	
application	of	their	Investor	Education	Intervention,	based	on	our	experimental	results,	
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might	look	like	a	prime	case	of	boosting.	If	our	advice	were	followed,	investors	would	be	
presented	with	information	about	historical	fund	performances,	in	a	format	that	would	
increase	the	likelihood	that	their	decisions	would	optimize	their	returns,	reducing	the	
probability	that	their	savings	goals	would	be	frustrated.	The	intervention	is	thus	
intended	to	directly	improve	the	decision-making	resources	of	the	investor,	especially	
the	investor	with	a	RDU	risk	preference	structure,	and	might	plausibly	create	rationality	
spillovers	as	discussed	earlier.	In	particular,	people	familiarized	with	the	richer	
information	might	be	motivated	to	seek	it	out	when	they	make	other	financial	decisions	
under	risky	conditions.	The	intervention	does	not	manipulate	the	targets	in	the	
straightforward	sense	of	altering	their	environments	without	their	knowledge.		
On	deeper	reflection,	however,	matters	aren’t	so	clear-cut.	The	first	three	
columns	of	Table	1	are	taken	from	the	GYH	discussion	of	the	differences	between	
nudging	and	boosting.	In	the	fourth	column	we	add	our	assessment	of	the	fit	of	this	
taxonomy	to	the	recommendation	we	made	to	our	client	concerning	application	of	their	
Investor	Education	Intervention.	If	we	were	to	treat	GYH’s	table	as	providing	eight	
(non-exclusive)	criteria	for	distinguishing	a	nudge	from	a	boost,	then	our	recommended	
policy	would	emerge	as	an	exact	hybrid,	matching	a	nudge	on	four	criteria	and	a	boost	
on	the	other	four.		
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Table	1			Eight	assumptions	of	the	nudge	and	boost	approaches	
	
	 	
Nudge	
	
Boost	
Investor	
Education	
Intervention	
Cognitive	error	awareness	
Must	the	decision	maker	be	able	to	detect	the	
influence	of	error?	
No	 Yes	 No	
Cognitive	error	controllability	
Must	the	decision	maker	be	able	to	stop	or	
override	the	influence	of	the	error?	
No	 Yes	 Yes	
Information	about	goals	
Must	the	designer	know	the	specific	goals	of	
the	target	audience?	
Yes	 No	 Yes	
Information	about	the	goals’	distribution	
Must	the	designer	know	the	distribution	of	
goals	in	the	target	audience?	
Yes	 No	 Yes	
Policy	designer	and	cognitive	error	
Must	experts	be	less	error-prone	than	
decision	makers?	
Yes	 No	 Yes	
Policy	designer	and	benevolence	
Must	the	designer	be	benevolent?	
Yes	 No	 No	
Decision	maker	and	minimal	competence	
Must	the	decision	maker	be	able	to	acquire	
trained	skills?	
No	 Yes	 Yes	
Decision	maker	and	sufficient	motivation	
Must	the	decision	maker	be	motivated	to	use	
trained	skills?	
No	 Yes	 Yes	
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	 Our	assessments	in	the	fourth	column	require	some	explanation	and	justification.	
Where	the	first	row	is	concerned,	the	investors	have	historically	not	been	able	to	infer	
that	they	decided	in	error	until,	arguably,	well	after	the	fact.	Even	then,	according	to	our	
client,	most	did	not	attribute	their	early	selling	of	their	funds	to	any	error	made	by	them,	
though	they	sometimes	expressed	disappointment	in	the	provider	or	advisor.	But	in	
general	our	advice	does	not	rest	on	the	assumption	that	any	investors	are	ever	aware	of	
any	errors.	The	suggestion	is	rather	that	information	about	historical	distributions	of	
fund	values	make	people	who	reveal	RDU	risk	preference	structures	behave	more	like	
people	with	EUT	risk	preferences.	With	respect	to	the	second	row,	clearly	the	
intervention	is	motivated	by	the	client’s	view	that	many	investors	choose	in	such	a	way	
as	to	undermine	their	own	welfare,	as	attributed	based	on	their	observed	behavior,	but	
can	be	induced	to	alter	their	decisions	in	at	least	a	significant	proportion	of	instances.	
Concerning	our	assessments	in	the	third	and	fourth	rows,	the	main	point	of	the	further	
experimental	evidence	we	urged	our	client	to	obtain	is	to	gain	richer	knowledge	of	the	
structure	of	their	customers’	preferences	(i.e.,	RDU	or	EUT),	and	of	the	distribution	of	
non-EUT	preferences.14	Clearly	this	implies,	as	per	the	fifth	row,	that	the	experts	are	less	
error	prone	than	the	investors,	and	it	is	far	from	clear	that	it	would	be	generally	
efficacious	for	the	experts	to	try	to	explain	the	differences	between	RDU	and	EUT	
preference	structures	to	investors.	Where	the	sixth	row	is	concerned,	as	discussed	
earlier	we	suspect	that	our	client	is	benevolent	about	investors’	welfare	to	some	extent,	
but	this	motivation	is	not	necessary,	as	it	is	in	the	investment	house’s	interest	for	
customers	to	maintain	their	investments	through	market	downturns.	Finally,	the	
intervention	is	only	efficacious	to	the	extent	that	investors	are	able	and	motivated	to	be	
influenced	by	carefully	designed	representations	of	more	complete	information	to	
choose	in	ways	that	better	approximate	what	they	would	choose	were	they	expected	
utility	optimizers.		
	 The	general	diagnosis	of	the	hybrid	nature	of	the	intervention	as	between	
nudging	and	boosting	lies	in	the	epistemic	status	and	the	normative	presuppositions	of	
the	economic	experts	(i.e.,	us).	With	respect	to	the	former,	we	have	technical	knowledge	
about	the	relationship	between	objective	risk	and	subjective	preference	structures	that	
investors	lack,	and	that	would	be	difficult	to	directly	explain	to	most	of	them,	let	alone	
to	directly	inspire	through	exhortation	(Ambuehl,	Bernheim	and	Lusardi	2014).	
Concerning	normative	presuppositions,	we	assume	that	by	revealing	preferences	in	
relatively	simple	decision	contexts,	choices	between	risky	lotteries,	people	provide	an	
informational	basis	for	assessing	the	implications	for	their	own	welfare	of	decisions	in	
more	complicated	circumstances.		
This	follows,	in	part,	an	approach	exemplified	and	promoted	in	a	similar	problem	
context	by	Harrison	and	Ng	(2016),	when	they	evaluate	the	welfare	gain	‘introduced	
																																																								
14	A	referee	objected	that	our	client	would	not	need	to	track	specific	goals	of	any	
customers	once	the	intervention	had	been	administered,	but	would	simply	leave	it	to	
the	‘educated’	customers	to	reflect	their	new	information	in	their	choices	or	not.	Thus	
the	referee	suggested	that	our	assessments	should	be	“no”	in	column	4	of	rows	3	and	4.	
This	suggestion	depends	on	equivocation	over	what	the	intervention	is:	the	client	
viewed	administration	of	the	education	intervention	as	burdensome	to	customers.	If	the	
client	company	follows	our	advice,	then,	it	will	be	selecting	certain	customers	to	be	
burdened	on	the	basis	of	identifications	made	by	it,	not	on	the	basis	of	self-
identifications	by	customers	of	their	own	needs	in	light	of	enhanced	knowledge.	
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into	the	world’	by	a	standard	type	of	indemnity	insurance	product.	They	aim	to	reliably	
estimate	the	distribution	of	risk	preferences	among	individuals,	and	the	distribution	of	
their	subjective	beliefs	about	loss	contingencies	and	likelihood	of	payout,	so	as	to	
identify	a	certainty	equivalent	of	a	risky	insurance	policy	that	can	be	compared	to	the	
certain	insurance	premium.	This	simple	logic	extends	to	non-standard	models	of	risk	
preferences,	such	as	RDU,	in	which	some	people	exhibit	‘optimism’	or	‘pessimism’	about	
loss	contingencies	in	their	evaluation	of	the	risky	insurance	policy.		
Harrison	and	Ng	(2016)	illustrate	the	application	of	these	basic	ideas	about	the	
welfare	evaluation	of	insurance	policies	in	a	controlled	laboratory	experiment,	just	as	
we	do	in	the	case	study	reviewed	here.	They	estimate	the	risk	preferences	of	individuals	
from	one	task,	and	separately	present	each	individual	with	a	number	of	insurance	
policies	in	which	loss	contingencies	are	objective,	so	there	is	no	issue	about	subjective	
beliefs	being	biased.	They	then	estimate	the	expected	consumer	surplus	gained	or	
foregone	from	observed	take-up	decisions.	There	is	striking	evidence	of	foregone	
expected	consumer	surplus	from	incorrect	take-up	decisions.	This	motivates	a	highly	
relevant	and	general	policy	conclusion,	namely,	that	the	metric	of	take-up	itself,	widely	
used	in	welfare	evaluations	of	insurance	products,	provides	a	qualitatively	incorrect	
guide	to	the	expected	welfare	effects	of	insurance.	
Economists	typically	infer	agents’	subjective	assessments	of	value	from	their	
actual	choices.	This	need	not	be	based	on	an	analytic	identification	of	preferences	with	
choices,	as	in	Samuelson’s	(1937)(1938)	original	version	of	revealed	preference	theory.	
Ross	(2014)	argues	that	is	more	defensibly	based	on	the	philosophical	thesis	of	
externalism	about	the	contents	of	intentional	attitude	ascriptions,	upon	which	we	
elaborate	in	Section	5	below.	According	to	that	thesis,	such	attitudes,	which	include	
beliefs	as	well	as	preferences,	are	ascribed	by	people	to	others	and	to	themselves	in	
such	a	way	as	to	rationalize	patterns	of	observed	behavior	(including	utterances).	Thus	
we	do	not	take	preferences	to	be	internal	psychological	states.	Intentional	attitude	
ascription	is	holistic,	taking	account	of	all	such	behavior	as	is	evident.	We	thus	have	no	
quarrel	with	the	insistence	of	Hausman	(2011)	that	preference	ascriptions	implicate	
assumptions	about	beliefs,	but	we	add	to	this	the	claim	that	belief	ascriptions	likewise	
implicate	assumptions	about	preferences.	The	co-dependence	of	belief	ascription	and	
preference	ascription	is	not	viciously	circular.	Intentional	attitude	ascription	is	
recursive	and	always	open	to	revision	as	more	evidence	arrives.	With	Binmore	(2009)	
we	regard	it	as	misleading	to	say	that	a	person’s	preference	for	some	X	over	some	Y	is	a	
cause	of	their	choosing	X	over	Y;	on	the	other	hand,	behavior	that	is	rationalized	by	
ascribing	a	preference	for	X’s	over	Y’s	can	be	part	of	the	information	background	for	
predicting	or	explaining	a	specific	new	instance	of	choice	of	X	over	Y.	Furthermore,	past	
behavior	rationalized	by	this	preference	ascription	can	also	be	part	of	the	explanatory	
background	for	a	choice	among	other	contingencies	related	to	X	and	Y,	and	this	can	be	
crucial	in	motivating	welfare	judgments.	
Let	us	apply	this	methodological	point	to	the	normative	analysis	given	by	
Harrison	and	Ng	(2016).	Suppose	we	think	that	a	person	has	chosen	an	insurance	policy	
that	will	reduce	their	utility	relative	to	the	state	in	which	they	did	not	choose	the	policy.	
If	we	were	forced	by	crude	revealed	preference	dogma	to	say	that	the	choice	of	the	
policy	necessarily	revealed	a	preference	for	having	the	policy	over	not	having	the	policy,	
then	it	would	be	impossible	for	any	such	choice	to	ever	be	deemed	welfare	reducing.	
This	would	show	that	the	concept	had	been	drained	of	the	content	that	makes	it	useful.	
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If	we	can’t	even	say	that	a	person	reduces	their	welfare	when	they	buy	an	actuarially	
unsound	insurance	policy	(which	people	do),	then	we’ll	never	be	able	to	say	anything	
about	welfare	in	an	applied	context.	But	it	would	be	consistent	with	taking	behavior	as	
the	informational	basis	for	preference	ascription	to	hold	that	the	choice	was	a	mistake	
based	on	its	inconsistency	with	ascription	of	a	risk	preference	structure	attributed	on	
the	basis	of	a	run	of	the	person’s	other	behavior.	
	 Lottery	choices	made	under	controlled	experimental	conditions,	as	in	our	case	
study,	arguably	provide	a	more	direct	and	less	noisy	probe	of	risk	preference	structure	
than	the	choices	of	investment	funds,	also	made	in	the	lab,	with	which	to	make	
comparisons.	Of	course	attribution	of	risk	preferences	derived	from	the	lottery	choices	
to	the	subjects	choosing	funds	depends	on	the	assumption	that	to	some	specified	extent	
subjects’	risk	preferences	are	stable	across	choice	contexts.	This	is	often,	though	not	
always,	a	reasonable	assumption	in	policy	contexts.	15	 	
This	general	methodological	approach	allows	the	economist	to	draw	useful	
conclusions	about	what	types	of	decisions	led	to	welfare	losses,	and	to	identify	
demographics	that	are	more	likely	to	make	those	types	of	decisions.	To	illustrate,	again	
from	the	insurance	policy	choices	considered	by	Harrison	and	Ng	(2016):	out	of	all	
purchase	decisions	made	by	the	subjects	in	their	experiment,	60%	were	associated	with	
a	welfare	loss.	Notably,	female	subjects	had	a	9.8	pp	higher	chance	than	men	of	making	
such	excess	purchase	errors,	with	a	95%	confidence	interval	between	0	pp	and	20	pp.	
When	Harrison	&	Ng	(2016)	consider	the	marginal	effect	of	gender,	controlling	for	other	
demographics,	this	estimated	effect	was	11.8	pp	with	a	95%	confidence	interval	
between	1	pp	and	23	pp.	This	type	of	information	allows	the	economist	to	recommend	
structured	interventions	to	improve	decisions	by	targeting	certain	demographic	groups	
and	certain	types	of	errors.	
A	further	potential	knowledge	gain	from	welfare	assessment	based	on	
sophisticated	revealed	preference	experiments	in	lab	and	field	is	that	one	can	rigorously	
identify	which	axioms	of	a	normative	model	of	risk	preferences	fail	when	one	observes	
expected	welfare	losses.	For	instance,	are	the	subjects	that	suffer	losses	when	faced	
with	an	index	insurance	product	those	for	whom	the	Reduction	of	Compound	Lotteries	
axiom	fails	behaviorally?	Precise	characterizations	of	such	failures	can	be	identified	in	
experiments	(e.g.,	Harrison,	Martínez-Correa	and	Swarthout	2015),	just	as	the	lottery	
battery	employed	in	the	Investor	Education	Intervention	study	allows	us	to	structurally	
identify	behavioral	failures	of	the	Compound	Independence	axiom.		
It	might	seem	that	all	of	this	amounts	only	to	a	modest,	practical	point	that	
should	be	of	limited	interest	to	theorists.	That	is,	we	might	seem	to	be	saying	only	that,	
although	the	concepts	of	nudging	and	boosting	are	as	clear	as	can	reasonably	be	
expected	at	the	abstract	level,	consulting	clients	often	frame	the	questions	they	assign	to	
economists	in	terms	that	force	the	distinction	to	be	elided	in	practice.	In	that	case,	it	
might	be	thought	that	the	sole	upshot	is	that	economists	could	usefully	bring	the	
nudging/boosting	distinction	to	clients’	attention	while	research	briefs	are	being	
																																																								
15	Sugden	(2004)(2009)	denies,	at	least,	that	the	assumption	is	viable	generally	enough	
to	provide	a	sound	methodology	for	normative	economics.	We	take	up	his	objection	in	
Section	5.	
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negotiated,	so	that	clients	will	at	least	appreciate	that	presuppositions	they	bring	to	the	
framing	of	their	policy	options	may	embed	normative	blind	spots.	
In	fact,	however,	we	think	that	lessons	of	deeper	methodological,	and	indeed	
philosophical,	significance	can	be	taken	from	the	main	case	study	we	have	presented,	
and	from	its	relationship	to	the	Harrison	and	Ng	(2016)	case.	We	draw	out	these	
implications	in	the	concluding	section.	
5.	Welfare	Analysis	From	the	Intentional	Stance	
In	our	case	study,	although	we	recommended	additional	cognitive	preparation	
for	RDU	choosers	before	they	selected	investment	products,	we	did	not	recommend	
trying	to	teach	them	the	concept	of	probability	weighting	so	they	could	then	apply	this	
characterization	to	themselves.	This	is	only	partly	motivated	by	the	questionable	
practicality	of	the	pedagogical	task	that	would	be	required.	It	also	reflects	wariness	
about	telling	subjects	a	story	about	themselves	they	would	surely	interpret	as	telling	
them	that	they	possess	a	kind	of	internal	psychological	‘defect’	when	such	a	story	would	
outrun	our	available	data	and	is	in	any	case	doubtful	according	to	sophisticated	
philosophy	of	mind.	
	It	is	unlikely	that	most	people	choosing	investment	funds	attempt	to	compute	
internally	represented	optima	–	either	from	EUT	or	RDU	bases	–	and	then	make	
computational	errors	that	could	be	pointed	out	to	them.	This	echoes	a	point	made	by	
Infante,	Lecouteux	and	Sugden	(2016)	(ILS)	when	they	complain	that	behavioral	
welfare	economists	typically	follow	Hausman	(2011)	in	‘purifying’	empirically	observed	
preferences.	ILS	argue	that	purification	reflects	an	implicit	philosophy	according	to	
which	an	‘inner’	Savage-rational	agent	is	‘trapped	within’	a	psychological,	irrational	
‘shell’	from	which	best	policy	should	try	to	rescue	her.		ILS	provide	no	general	
philosophical	framework	within	which	they	motivate	their	skepticism	about	‘inner	
rational	agents’.	However,	such	a	framework	is	available.		
Dennett	(1987)	provides	a	rich	account	of	the	ontology	of	beliefs,	preferences	
and	other	‘propositional	attitude’	that	relate	behavioral	and	cognitive	dispositions	to	
different	states	of	the	world	and	to	different	representations	of	those	states.	Dennett	
(1987)	argues	at	length	that	ascribing	preferences	and	beliefs	involves	taking	the	
intentional	stance	toward	an	agent.	This	consists	in	assuming	that	the	agent’s	behavior	
is	guided	by	goals	and	is	sensitive	to	information	about	means	to	the	goals,	and	about	
the	relative	probabilities	of	achieving	the	goals	given	available	means.	Goals,	like	
preferences	and	beliefs,	are	not	internal	states	of	agents,	but	are	rather	relationships	
between	agents,	environments,	and	ascribers,	The	baseline	case	for	understanding	such	
ascription	is	effort	by	a	third	party	to	interpret	and	predict	the	agent’s	actions	by	means	
of	controlled	speculation	about	an	agent’s	overall	behavioral	ecology	and	information-
processing	capacities.	Crucially,	people	are	socially	obliged,	and	trained	during	
socialization	while	growing	up,	to	adopt	the	intentional	stance	toward	themselves.	For	
the	sake	of	coordination	in	both	action	and	communication,	agents’	self-ascriptions	are	
made	under	constraint	of	at	least	approximate	alignment	with	ascriptions	of	others.			
These	ascriptions	and	self-ascriptions	are	not	guesses	about	‘true’	beliefs	and	
preferences	hidden	from	direct	view	in	people’s	heads.	Rather,	constructed	
rationalizations	of	agents’	behavioral	and	cognitive	ecologies	is	what	beliefs	and	
preferences	are.	Critics	have	sometimes	misinterpreted	this	view	as	instrumentalism,	a	
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doctrine	according	to	which	beliefs	and	preferences	are	mere	useful	fictions.	Dennett	
has	consistently	maintained,	however,	that	there	are	facts	of	the	matter	about	agents’	
goals	and	access	to	information,	and	hence	also	facts	about	their	propositional	attitudes.	
It	may	be	true	that	Carol	goes	to	work	because	she	believes	that	if	she	does	she	will	get	
paid,	and	prefers	having	the	paycheque	to	having	the	leisure	she	would	gain	if	she	
bunked	the	job;	but	this	truth	status	need	not	depend	on	there	being	discrete,	recurring	
states	of	Carol’s	nervous	system	that	realize	the	belief	and,	separately,	the	preferences.	
Beliefs	and	preferences	are	virtual	states16	of	whole	intentional	systems	rather	than	
particular	physical	states	of	brains;	but	being	virtual	is	a	way	of	being	real,	not	a	way	of	
being	fictitious.		
If	a	claim	about	intentional	states	is	the	sort	of	claim	that	can	have	a	truth	value,	
then	it	had	better	be	possible	to	specify	possible	evidence	that	would	undermine	it.	The	
holistic	nature	of	intentional	stance	description	allows	for	error,	but	also	complicates	it.	
Suppose	we	did	not	know,	in	setting	out	to	explain	Carol’s	behavior,	that	she	has	just	
won	the	lottery	and	so	no	longer	needs	the	paycheque;	but	suppose	further	we	also	did	
not	know	that	she	would	be	ashamed	to	pass	on	a	half-finished	project	to	the	colleague	
who	will	succeed	her.		On	this	hypothetical	scenario,	we	predicted	correctly	that	Carol	
would	go	to	work	because	our	two	bits	of	ignorance	cancelled	one	another	out;	but	the	
error	will	reveal	itself	as	we	widen	the	sample	of	observations	so	that	we	include	days	
beyond	completion	of	Carol’s	current	projects.	It	can	also	show	up	when	we	expand	the	
range	of	behavior	the	intentional	stance	is	called	upon	to	rationalize	–	when	we	ask,	for	
example,	why	Carol	is	no	longer	starting	any	new	projects.	Nevertheless,	the	holism	of	
intentional	attitude	ascription	does	leave	room	for	interpretive	slack	that	we	would	not	
expect	if	we	embraced	naïve	psychological	realism	associating	beliefs	and	preferences	
with	particular	occurrent	states	in	nervous	systems.	When	we	say	that	Carol	prefers	not	
to	leave	projects	partly	completed,	do	we	refer	to	her	conscientiousness,	or	to	her	fear	
of	harm	to	her	reputation?	There	might	or	might	not	be	a	fact	of	the	matter	here,	and	
whether	there	is	or	isn’t	might	not	be	relevant	to	the	accuracy	of	the	preference	
ascription.	
Ross	(2014)	argues	that	this	marks	a	main	basis	for	the	distinction	between	
economics	and	psychology.	Psychologists	are	professionally	interested	directly	in	how	
individuals	process	information,	including	information	that	influences	decisions.	
Economists,	by	contrast,	are	concerned	with	this	only	derivatively.	If	a	system	of	
incentives	will	lead	various	people,	through	a	heterogeneous	set	of	psychological	
processes,	to	all	make	the	same	choice	then	the	people	form,	at	least	for	an	analysis	
																																																								
16	One	way	of	understanding	virtual	states	is	as	reaction	potentials	coupled	with	
environmental	affordances	in	the	sense	of	Gibson	(1977),	except	that	the	affordances	in	
question	will	frequently	be	features	of	social	events	rather	than	(only)	features	
detectable	directly	by	sensory	transducers.	Because	intentional	states	are	propensities	
inferred	from	patterns	of	behavior,	they	approximately	correspond	to	what	some	
psychologists	call	‘latent’	tendencies.	However,	psychologists	often	suppose	that	latent	
states	have	discrete	neural	realizations	that	might	be	discoverable	by	brain	probes	or	
functional	neuroimaging.	The	use	of	‘virtual’	expresses	the	view	among	many	current	
philosophers	that	intentional	states	generally	do	not	have	such	realizations	because	
their	semantic	contents,	what	is	believed	or	desired	or	preferred,	vary	partly	with	
conditions	external	to	the	bodies	of	the	agents	whose	states	they	are	(Burge	1986;	
McClamrock	1995).	
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restricted	to	that	choice,	an	equivalence	class	of	economic	agents.	But	it	is	a	strictly	
empirical	matter	when	this	psychological	heterogeneity	will	and	won’t	matter	
economically.	Economists,	like	all	scientists,	seek	generalizations	that	support	out-of-
sample	predictions.	Different	data-generating	processes	tend	to	produce,	sooner	or	
later,	different	data,	including	different	economic	data	(that	is,	series	of	or	patterns	in	
incentivized	choices).	Economics	is	thus	crucially	informed	by	psychology	in	general,	
while	not	collapsing	into	the	psychology	of	valuation	as	some	behavioral	economists	
have	urged	(Camerer	et	al	2005).	
Applying	this	philosophy	of	mind	and	agency	to	our	main	case	study,,	we	assume	
the	intentional	stance	to	make	sense	of	our	experimental	subjects’	overall	behavioral	
patterns,	and	use	the	lottery	choice	experiment	as	a	relatively	direct	source	of	constraint	
on	the	virtual	preference	structures	we	assign	when	we	perform	welfare	assessment	of	
their	investment	fund	choices.	Externalism	about	preference	content	blurs	the	distinction	
between	‘treating’	the	subject	and	‘treating’	the	subject’s	environment.	Furthermore,	the	
more	precisely	we	specify	the	contents	of	propositional	attitudes,	especially	in	
quantitative	terms,	the	less	weight	in	identification	will	rest	on	‘inboard’	elements	of	
data	generating	processes	relative	to	external	aspects	of	the	agents’	overall	behavioral	
ecologies.17	Our	technical	tools	allow	us	to	identify	virtual	intentions	that	most	subjects	
are	not	able	to	identify	when	they	take	the	intentional	stance	to	themselves,	and	that	
they	could	not	deliberately	use	to	evaluate	their	own	decisions.	On	the	other	hand,	our	
experiment	provides	evidence	that	attention	to	certain	informational	patterns	induces	a	
significant	number	of	subjects	to	act	as	if	they	were	stochastically	closer	to	expected	
value	optimizers.	These	patterns	therefore	enter	into	a	fully	informed	analyst’s	
specification	of	the	subjects’	beliefs	and	preferences.	In	this	philosophical	framework,	it	
makes	sense	to	say	that	we	boost	the	subjects’	informational	access	in	a	way	that	nudges	
their	(sub-deliberative)	cognition.	
It	helps	to	contextualize	our	approach	to	normative	analysis	to	contrast	it	with	
the	more	radical	revisionism	advocated	by	Sugden	(2004)(2009).	He	develops	an	
insightful	framework	for	normatively	evaluating	agents’	outcomes	under	alternative	
institutional	arrangements	in	a	way	that	privileges	their	autonomy	as	choosers	(i.e.,	
their	consumer	sovereignty)	without	depending	on	their	specific	preference	orderings,	
and	thus	without	requiring	their	preferences	to	even	be	consistently	ordered,	let	alone	
fully	EUT-compliant.	According	to	Sugden	(2004)(2009),	agents	are	made	better	off	to	
the	extent	that	their	opportunity	sets	are	expanded,	and	worse	off	to	the	extent	that	
their	opportunity	sets	are	contracted.	Against	this	standard,	‘pure’	boosts	will	typically	
make	agents	better	off	and	‘pure’	nudges	will	typically	make	them	worse	off.	We	find	
this	idea,	which	Sugden	(2004)(2009)	elegantly	formalizes,	attractive	as	a	way	of	
addressing	normative	questions	in	circumstances	where	welfare	analysis	in	the	
technical	sense	is	not	possible	due	to	preference	reversals.	Thus,	for	example,	this	
approach	can	generate	recommendations	in	cases	where	the	method	of	Bernheim	and	
Rangel	(2008)	and	Bernheim	(2016)	would	find	Pareto	indifference	and	therefore	yield	
no	guidance.	But	we	should	not	abjure	ever	doing	standard	welfare	analysis	merely	
because	it	can’t	be	undertaken	in	every	context.	In	both	the	Harrison	and	Ng	(2016)	case	
and	in	the	situation	presented	to	us	by	our	consulting	client,	the	complications	arise	
																																																								
17	Clark	(1998)	refers	to	these	external	elements	as	‘cognitive	scaffolding.’	Ross	
(2005)(2014)	develops	the	role	of	scaffolding	in	specifying	and	identifying	utility	
functions	using	sophisticated	revealed	preference	theory.	
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from	the	existence	of	preferences	that	violate	EUT	but	are	nevertheless	well-ordered.	
We	suggest	that	this	is	the	standard	situation	where	relevant	utilities	are	expected	
monetary	values.18		
To	summarize,	the	claimed	normative	advantage	of	boosting	over	nudging	relies	
on	the	distinction	between	altering	an	agent’s	inner	and	outer	environments.	This	might	
seem	relatively	straightforward	if	we	assume,	as	many	behavioral	economists	do,	that	
the	utility	functions	on	which	welfare	analysis	is	based	are	generally	grounded	in	latent	
cognitive	processes	on	the	‘inboard’	side	of	the	agent/environment	boundary.	However,	
economists	model	utility	in	a	way	that	is	better	captured	by	externalist/ascriptionist	
accounts	of	minds	such	as	Dennett’s	intentional	stance	(Ross	2014).	This	complicates,	
though	it	does	not	vitiate,	attempts	to	apply	the	nudging/boosting	distinction	to	
practical	economic	welfare	assessments.	
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